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Comment
Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State University:




Christi Brzonkala, a student at Virginia Polytechnic Insti-
tute and State University (VPI), was brutally raped in the fall
of 1994.' The incident occurred on the night of September 24th
when Christi first met James Crawford and Antonio Morrison,
two VPI football players, in a dorm room.2 Morrison asked
Christi to have sex with him, and Christi responded "No"
twice.3 Despite her repeated denials, Morrison twice forced
Christi to have sexual intercourse with him.4 Crawford also
allegedly raped Christi once that evening.5
After identifying her assailants,6 Christi filed a complaint
with the university under its sexual assault policy.' The uni-
* J.D. Candidate 1998, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 1995,
University of Minnesota-Morris.
1. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779,
782 (W.D. Va.), appeal docketed, No. 96-2316 (4th Cir. Sept. 24, 1996).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. After the incident, Morrison told Christi, 'You better not have any
fucking diseases." Id.
5. Id.
6. When Christi met Morrison and Crawford, she only knew their given
names and that they were members of the football team. Id. Christi first rec-
ognized the men about five months after the incident. Id. Before Christi filed
her complaint with the university, a VPI student heard Morrison say, "I like
to get girls drunk and fuck the shit out of them." Id.
7. Id. Christi did not file criminal charges against either assailant be-
cause she believed "that her failure to preserve physical evidence prevented
her from doing so." Brief for Appellant at *2, Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic
and State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va.) (Civ. A. No. 95-1358-R), appeal
docketed, No. 96-2316 (4th Cir. Sept. 24, 1996) (visited Mar. 17, 1997)
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versity's judicial committee held a hearing where Morrison
admitted that he had sexual intercourse with Christi after she
twice refused his requests by saying "No." 8 Crawford also tes-
tified that Morrison had sexual contact with Christi, but de-
nied that he himself had any sexual contact with her.9 The
committee found Morrison guilty of sexual assault and sus-
pended him for two semesters," but imposed no penalty on
Crawford because of insufficient evidence." Morrison appealed
the committee's findings, and VPI's Vice President suspended
the sanctions until after Morrison's graduation because he
considered them "excessive." 2 After hearing that Morrison
would return to school the following semester, 3 Christi can-
celed her plans to return to the university because she feared
for her safety. 4
Statistics demonstrate that situations like Christi's are all
too common in the United States, where violence against
women is pervasive.15 In response to this problem and public
<http//www.soconline.org/LEGAIJBRZONKALA/111896.html> [hereinafter Brief
for Appellant].
8. Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 782.
9. Id.
10. Id. Morrison appealed, and the appeals officer upheld the sanction.
Id. Morrison filed another appeal in which he claimed that VPI violated his
due process rights because it failed to disseminate its sexual assault policy.
Brief for Appellant, supra note 7, at *2. The committee held another hearing
and re-imposed the suspension against Morrison, but only found him guilty of
using abusive language. Id. at *3; see also Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 782
(stating that Christi learned that the committee only found Morrison guilty of
using abusive language through a newspaper article).
11. 935 F. Supp. at 782.
12. Brief for Appellant, supra note 7, at *3. The Vice President only re-
quired that Morrison attend a one-hour class on acceptable student behavior
and deferred his suspension until after graduation. Id.
13. Morrison returned to school on a full athletic scholarship. Id. The
university did not tell Christi that it had deferred Morrison's suspension. Id.
Christi only learned of his reinstatement through a Washington Post article.
Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 782.
14. Id.
15. A woman is beaten by her partner every 15 seconds. Violence Against
Women: Victims of the System: Hearings on S. 15 Before the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 238 (1991) (statement of Elizabeth Athanasakos,
National President, National Federation of Business and Professional Women,
Inc.) [hereinafter 1991 Hearings]. Violence against women is the leading
cause of injury to women ages 15 to 44. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 38 (1993).
Reported assaults against women totaled over 1.1 million in 1991, and unre-
ported assaults account for over three times that amount. Id. at 37. In 1991,
2,000 women reported being raped and 90 women were murdered each week,
with men committing 90% of these crimes. Id. at 38. The Senate report also
found that "4 million women a year are victims of domestic violence" and that
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outcry over gender-based crime, Congress enacted the Violence
Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA). 6 The Act strengthens
penalties for existing federal sex crimes and provides $1.6 bil-
lion over six years for education, research, treatment of do-
mestic and sex crime victims, and improvement of state crimi-
nal justice systems.' 7  The Act also creates a civil cause of
action for victims of gender-motivated crimes. 8
Christi Brzonkala was one of the first individuals who at-
tempted to use this new civil cause of action against her assail-
ants.19 Specifically, Christi accused Morrison and Crawford of
sexually assaulting her with discriminatory animus toward her
gender that violated her right to be free from gender-motivated
violence under the VAWA.2° The Brzonkala court, however,
dismissed her claim, holding that Congress lacked the author-
ity to create this cause of action under either the Commerce
Clause or section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.21
Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State University
raises important issues regarding Congress's ability to enact
three out of four women will be the victim of a violent crime at least once in
their lifetime. Id. More recent crime statistics show that a woman was forci-
bly raped every five minutes in 1995. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES 4 (1995).
16. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, tit. IV, Pub.
L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 1902 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered
titles of U.S.C.). Congress enacted the VAWA to combat "the escalating
problem of violent crime against women." S. REP. No. 103-138, at 37 (1993)
(indicating why Senator Joseph Biden introduced the bill).
17. See 108 Stat. at 1902-55 (listing appropriations in various sections of
Title IV); see also Catherine F. Klein, Full Faith and Credit: Interstate En-forcement of Protection Orders Under the Violence Against Women Act of 1994,
29 FAM. L.Q. 253, 253 (1995) (noting that the VAWA "attempts to make
crimes committed against women considered in the same manner as those
motivated by religious, racial, or political bias").
18. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (1994). The VAWA's civil cause of action is gen-
erally referred to as the "civil rights remedy," "the VAWA," or "the Act"
throughout this Comment.
19. Prior to Christi's case, only one reported case had challenged the con-
stitutionality of the VAWA's civil cause of action. See Doe v. Doe, 929 F.
Supp. 608, 610 (D. Conn. 1996) (upholding the VAWA under the Commerce
Clause).
Christi also sued VPI under the Education Amendments of 1972, 20
U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (1994). See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State
Univ., 935 F. Supp. 772, 773 (W.D. Va.), appeal docketed, No. 96-2316 (4th
Cir. Sept. 24, 1996). The district court dismissed this claim. Id. at 779.
20. See Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 784 (discussing Brzonkala's factual
support for her allegation). The court held that Christi successfully stated a
claim for relief under the VAWA's civil rights remedy. Id. at 785.
21. Id. at 801.
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legislation to protect victims of gender-based crimes in federal
and state courts. The case tests the limits of congressional
authority under the Commerce Clause following the Supreme
Court decision in United States v. Lopez22 and examines the
scope of congressional power under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
This Comment argues that Brzonkala was incorrectly de-
cided because section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment author-
ized Congress to enact the VAWA. Part I discusses Commerce
Clause and Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, and the
VAWA and its legislative history. Part I also discusses Doe v.
Doe,23 the only other case addressing the VAWA's constitu-
tionality. Part II outlines the Brzonkala court's decision and
its analysis of Congress's authority to enact the VAWA. Part
III argues that the VAWA is beyond congressional power under
the Commerce Clause, but is within the scope of congressional
authority under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. This
Comment concludes that courts should recognize Congress's
ability to create private causes of action to remedy state depri-
vations of equal protection rights, and therefore should uphold
the VAWA.
I. CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY TO REGULATE
GENDER-BASED CRIMES
A. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S POWER TO REGULATE
The federal government possesses limited powers that are
specifically enumerated in the Constitution. 4  As early as
1819, the Supreme Court declared that "[t]he principle that
[the federal government] can exercise only the powers granted
to it... is now universally admitted."25 While several parts of
22. 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1634 (1995) (striking down the Gun-Free School
Zones Act of 1990).
23. 929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996).
24. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted
shall be vested in [the] Congress ... ."); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819) ("Th[e] [federal] government is acknowledged by all to
be one of enumerated powers."); THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292-93 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("The powers delegated by the proposed
Constitution are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State
governments are numerous and indefinite."); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-1, at 297 (1988) ("Congress is thus a legislative body
possessing only limited powers-those granted to it by the Constitution.").
25. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 405; see also U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The Pow-
[Vol. 81:16011604
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the Constitution grant Congress various powers,26 the primary
grant of authority originates from Article I, section 8.27 That
section explicitly lists Congress's most significant powers, in-
cluding the power to tax, regulate commerce, produce money,
and declare war.28 This section also grants Congress the power
to make laws that are "necessary and proper" to carry out all of
the Constitution's enumerated powers.29 The Necessary and
Proper Clause is a broad grant of congressional authority to
enact legislation that is "appropriate" to promote legitimate
constitutional goals.3
B. CONGRESSIONAL POWER UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
The enumerated power upon which Congress primarily re-
lies to enact legislation is the Commerce Clause,3' which allows
ers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.").
26. See, e.g., U.S. CONST art. IV, § 1 (granting Congress the power to give
full faith and credit to other states' acts, records, and judicial proceedings); id.
art. IV, § 3 (granting Congress the power to admit new states); id. art. V
(granting Congress the power to amend the Constitution); id. amend. XIV, § 5
(granting Congress the power to enforce due process, equal protection, and
other Fourteenth Amendment rights); id. amend. XV, § 2 (granting Congress
the power to limit infringements on voting rights that are based on race, color,
or previous condition of servitude); id. amend. XVI (granting Congress the
power to tax income); id. amend. XIX, § 2 (granting Congress the power to
limit infringements on voting rights that are based on sex); id. amend. XXVI
(granting Congress the power to limit infringements on the voting rights of
people 18 years of age or older).
27. Id. art. I, § 8.
28. Id.
29. Id. cl. 18.
30. The Supreme Court established the scope of the Necessary and
Proper Clause in McCulloch v. Maryland: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be
within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate,
which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consis-
tent with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." 17 U.S.
at 421; see also TRIBE, supra note 24, § 5-3, at 301 (discussing the importance
of the implied powers within clause 18 to the scope of congressional power).
This broad formulation of congressional power applies not only to the enu-
merated powers defined in Article I, but to "all other Powers vested by this
Constitution." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. "Necessary," as the Court de-
fined it in McCulloch, does not mean "absolutely and indispensably necessary"
to exercising a constitutional power, but instead means whatever measures
are "useful and appropriate" to achieving that end. 17 U.S. at 354-56.
3L See TRIBE, supra note 24, § 5-4, at 305-06 ("The commerce clause
is... the chief source of congressional regulatory power."). Congress has en-
acted, and the Supreme Court has upheld, numerous important Commerce
Clause regulations since the 1930s. See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min-
ing & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 275-83 (1981) (upholding a fed-
16051997]
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Congress to "regulate Commerce... among the several States.""
Under the Commerce Clause, Congress may regulate channels
of interstate commerce, 33 instrumentalities of or persons or
things in interstate commerce, 34 or activities having a sub-
stantial effect on interstate commerce. 35 Between 1937 and
1994,36 the Supreme Court found every congressional enact-
ment under the Commerce Clause sufficiently connected to in-
terstate commerce to justify federal regulation.37  One of the
eral regulation of private mining lands); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241, 261-62 (1964) (upholding application of Title II of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 to a motel); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294,
305 (1964) (upholding application of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to a
restaurant); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 118-29 (1942) (upholding appli-
cation of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 to a farmer growing and
consuming wheat on his farm).
32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
33. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629 (identifying three categories Congress
may regulate under the Commerce Clause); Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S.
at 261 (upholding application of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to a motel that
served interstate travelers); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123 (1941)
(upholding a statute that prohibited goods produced in violation of work con-
dition regulations from traveling in interstate commerce).
34. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629; see also Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S.
342, 351-55 (1914) (upholding regulation of intrastate railways that competed
with interstate railways); Southern Ry. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20, 26-
27 (1911) (upholding federal regulation of locomotives and railcars).
35. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629.
36. Prior to the Court's 1937 decision in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), the Court significantly constrained Congress's power
under the Commerce Clause by imposing a variety of formal limitations. In
an early Commerce Clause case, the Court held that Congress could not
regulate manufacturing activities because they preceded commerce. United
States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895). The Court also stated that
Congress could not regulate activities that only indirectly affected interstate
commerce. See A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495,
550 (1935) (striking down regulation of slaughterhouse employees' hours and
wages).
Jones & Laughlin Steel signaled the end of the Court's use of these for-
malistic limitations on the commerce power. In Jones & Laughlin Steel, the
Court upheld the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, which created the
right to form unions and required employer participation in collective bargain-
ing, despite the statute's regulation of manufacturing and only indirect effect
on interstate commerce. 301 U.S. at 38-40. The Court found a sufficient
nexus to interstate commerce because the legislation targeted activities that
"have such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their
control is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and
obstructions." Id. at 37.
37. See supra note 31 (listing important Commerce Clause cases after the
1930s); see also Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 147 (1971) (upholding
Title II of the Consumer Credit Protection Act); Darby, 312 U.S. at 123
(upholding the Fair Labor Standards Act); Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
[Vol. 81:16011606
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most far-reaching examples of the Supreme Court's deference
to Congress's use of its commerce power is found in Wickard v.
Filburn.8 In Wickard, the Supreme Court upheld a federal
regulation limiting the amount of wheat an individual could
grow on his farm for his own consumption. 39 The Court found
that the Act's regulation of home-grown wheat was sufficiently
linked to interstate commerce. The Court reasoned that while
one farmer's excess production might not have a significant
impact on interstate commerce, the same conduct repeated by
those similarly situated could have a significant impact on in-
terstate commerce by reducing market prices for wheat.4
0
In 1995, the Supreme Court unexpectedly limited Con-
gress's commerce power in United States v. Lopez.4' In Lopez,
the Court for the first time in nearly sixty years struck down a
statute enacted under the Commerce Clause.42 The case in-
volved Congress's 1990 enactment of the Gun Free School
Zones Act (GFSZA), which criminalized "possess[ion of] a fire-
arm at a place that the individual knows... is a school zone."43
The Supreme Court held that the Act was not within Con-
gress's Commerce Clause powers because it did not have a suf-
ficient nexus with interstate commerce.4
U.S. at 49 (upholding the National Labor Relations Act of 1935); cf. Stephen
M. McJohn, The Impact of United States v. Lopez: The New Hybrid Commerce
Clause, 34 DUQ. L. REV. 1, 2 (1995) ("Lopez thus breaks a long line of cases
deferring to congressional action.").
38. 317 U.S. 111 (1942); see also Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630.(stating that
Wickard "is perhaps the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause
authority").
39. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128-29. Filburn grew 23 acres of wheat on his
farm, exceeding his federally imposed quota. Id. at 114.
40. Id. at 128-29. Congress regulated wheat production to prevent fluc-
tuations in wheat prices. Id. at 115. The Court recognized that Congress had
the power to regulate commodity prices and that the Act promoted that pur-
pose by limiting the supply of wheat. Id. at 128. Because Filburn grew wheat
in excess of his quota, he did not buy wheat on the market. His actions de-
feated Congress's goal by reducing market demand and wheat prices. Id. at
128-29.
41. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
42. See McJohn, supra note 37, at 1 (noting that the last time the Court
struck a federal statute enacted under the Commerce Clause was 1937). De-
spite creating a major rift in Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the Court
reached its decision without overruling a single case. See Kathleen F.
Brickey, Crime Control and the Commerce Clause: Life After Lopez, 46 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 801, 811 (1996) (discussing how Lopez avoided overruling
prior cases).
43. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (1994).
44. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-34.
1997] 1607
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
The Court quickly concluded that the GFSZA did not
regulate channels of interstate commerce or protect an instru-
mentality of interstate commerce, and stated that the Act could
only possibly be sustained as a regulation of activity substan-
tially affecting interstate commerce.45 To preface its analysis,
the Court noted that it had previously upheld regulations of a
variety of intrastate economic activities that substantially af-
fected interstate commerce 6 The Court warned, however, that
it would not test the constitutionality of regulations of non-
economic intrastate activity in "cases upholding regulations of
activities that arise out of or are connected with a commercial
transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially af-
fects interstate commerce."47 The Court concluded that the
GFSZA did not regulate an economic enterprise and was not an
essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity.48 The
45. Id. at 1630. The Court clarified that the third category required a
"substantial effect," rather than merely an "effect" on interstate commerce.
Id. Professor Merritt argues that the Court's use of the "substantial effect"
requirement is analogous to the tort concept of proximate cause. Deborah
Jones Merritt, COMMERCE!, 94 MICH. L. REV. 674, 679 (1995).
46. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630. The Court stated that Wickard was
"perhaps the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over
intrastate activity." Id. The Court also asserted that "[wihere economic activ-
ity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activ-
ity will be sustained." Id.
47. Id. at 1631. The Court has never held that the Commerce Clause al-
lows regulation of only commercial or economic activity. See Brickey, supra
note 42, at 807 (stating that the Court has not held that Congress can only
regulate economic or commercial activities). Because the Court made the
"economic" or "commercial" nature of the regulation in Lopez such an impor-
tant factor, scholars have presented different views on its relevance. Some
conclude that Congress can regulate noneconomic activity if it adversely af-
fects an economic enterprise that is involved in commerce. See, e.g., id. at 811
(concluding that Congress may regulate noncommercial activity under the
Commerce Clause if it adversely affects an economic enterprise engaged in
commerce). Others contend that the Court will impose harsher limits on
regulations of noncommercial or noneconomic activities than were previously
imposed under the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., McJohn, supra note 37, at 27
(arguing that the Court abandoned its lenient Commerce Clause analysis in a
move towards imposing more limitations on Commerce Clause regulations).
Still others argue that noneconomic regulations will withstand scrutiny only
when they have a nexus with commercial transactions of an interstate magni-
tude, especially if a core state function is involved. See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey,
The Fool on the Hill: Congressional Findings, Constitutional Adjudication,
and United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 695, 706 (1996)
(suggesting that the noneconomic nature of the GFSZA and its intrusion into
a core state function were crucial to the Court's decision in Lopez).
48. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-31. The Court noted that the regulation up-
held in Wickard "involved economic activity in a way that the possession of a
[Vol. 81:16011608
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Court stated that the GFSZA was a criminal statute that
"ha[d] nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic
enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms."
49
Moreover, the Court noted that the Act contained no jurisdic-
tional element requiring the firearm at issue to affect or travel
through interstate commerce before implicating the statute.50
In determining whether a regulated activity substantially
affected interstate commerce, the Court stated that it would
gun in a school zone does not." Id. at 1630. Justice Kennedy's concurring
opinion came to a similar conclusion, noting that "unlike the earlier cases to
come before the Court here neither the actors nor their conduct have a com-
mercial character, and neither the purposes nor the design of the statute have
an evident commercial nexus." Id. at 1640 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
49. Id. at 1630-31. The Court asserted that gun possession near schools
did not constitute an "economic" activity, but did not define what "economic"
meant. Id. Professor McJohn argues that "economic" could define gun pos-
session if the term were interpreted broadly. McJohn, supra note 37, at 26-
27. Education could also constitute an economic activity under a broad defi-
nition of "economic," because the student foregoes consumption and productiv-
ity in the present to invest in increased future productivity and consumption.
Id. McJohn states that the Court "used the term in a narrower sense, leaving
it for future cases to distinguish between economic and noneconomic activity."
Id. at 27.
Although the Court did not provide a formal definition of "economic" or
"commercial," it did note that "depending on the level of generality, any activ-
ity can be looked upon as commercial." Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1633; see also id.
at 1640 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("In a sense any conduct in this interde-
pendent world of ours has an ultimate commercial origin or consequence, but we
have not yet said the commerce power may reach so far."). The Court made this
statement while rejecting Justice Breyer's argument that "Congress ... could
rationally conclude that schools fall on the commercial side of the line." Id. at
1633 (quoting Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion in Lopez). The Court stated
that such a broad definition of "commercial" lacked any real limits and would
impermissibly justify federal regulation of every aspect of local schools. Id.
The Court acknowledged that determining whether an activity is commercial
or noncommercial can result in legal uncertainty, but said that uncertainty
always results when determining the limits of constitutionally enumerated
powers. Id.
50. Id. at 1631. The Court distinguished a prior case upholding federal
regulation of gun possession because it required a showing that the gun had
an explicit connection to interstate commerce, whereas the GFSZA contained
no such requirement. Id. (discussing United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336
(1971)). Some commentators believe that if the GFSZA would have required
that the gun travel in interstate commerce, it could have withstood judicial
scrutiny. See Brickey, supra note 42, at 817 (claiming that Congress could
regulate gun possession near schools if it had the right jurisdictional hook);
McJohn, supra note 37, at 34-35 (stating that Congress could regulate gun
possession in school zones if it provided a jurisdictional requirement); cf
Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 575 (1977) (holding that a gun
shown to travel through interstate commerce provided sufficient nexus to in-
terstate commerce). But see Merritt, supra note 45, at 697 (stating that it is
unclear whether a jurisdictional hook would have saved the GFSZA).
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consider legislative findings as part of its "independent
evaluation of constitutionality."51 In Lopez, however, the Court
could not consider the GFSZA's legislative history because
Congress did not make any pre-enactment findings regarding
the effects on interstate commerce of gun possession in a school
zone. 2 The Court stated that it did not require congressional
findings, but suggested that they would be helpful when a
regulated activity's nexus to interstate commerce was not
"visible to the naked eye."53
The Court then rejected the government's arguments that
gun possession in a school zone substantially affected inter-
state commerce.5 4 The government argued that guns in school
zones increase violent crime, which hampers learning, results
in lower productivity, and leads to a depressed national econ-
omy' 5 The Court rejected this "national productivity" argu-
ment because Congress could use such a rationale to support
federal regulation of any activity found to affect national pro-
ductivity, including areas of traditional state control, such as
family law and education.5 6 The Court also found unpersua-
sive the government's argument that guns in school zones in-
crease crime and increased crime imposes costs on society
through higher insurance. 7 The Court rejected this "costs of
crime" argument because it would allow Congress to regulate
all violent crimes and any activities that might lead to violent
crimes. 5' The Court concluded that these rationales would re-
51. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631.
52. Id. The government conceded that "[n]either the statute nor its legis-
lative history contained express congressional findings regarding the effects
upon interstate commerce of gun possession in a school zone." Reply Brief for
the Petitioner at 5-6, United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1994) (No. 93-
1260). Congress did provide post-enactment legislative findings to support
the GFSZA's constitutionality in the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforce-
ment Act of 1994, but the government did not formally rely on those findings
as a substitute for the absence of them before the GFSZA's passage. Lopez,
115 S. Ct. at 1632 n.4.
53. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. The Court objected to the use of rationales that could support fed-
eral usurpation of a state's general police power under the Commerce Clause.
Id. The Court stated that the governmengs theory failed because allowing
regulation of activities that adversely affect learning would also allow regula-
tion of more core elements of education, including curriculum. Id. at 1633.
57. Id. at 1632.
58. Id.
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quire it "to pile inference upon inference" to uphold the Act and
could result in a dramatic, unacceptable increase in federal
power at the expense of state powers.
5 9
-Traditionally, the Court evaluated Congress's conclusions
regarding a regulated activity's nexus to interstate commerce
with a deferential rational basis standard of review." In prior
cases applying the extremely deferential standard, the Court
considered whether Congress had a rational basis for conclud-
ing that a regulated activity has an effect on interstate com-
merce.6 The Court in Lopez, however, applied a heightened
version of rational basis review by independently evaluating
whether a rational basis existed to conclude that the regulated
conduct in fact had a substantial effect on interstate com-
merce.
6 2
59. Id. at 1634. The Court stated that accepting the government's argu-
ments would allow Congress to regulate almost every activity. Id. at 1632.
The Court also stated that accepting these rationales would "convert congres-
sional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the
sort retained by the States." Id. at 1634.
60. See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc.,
452 U.S. 264, 277 (1981) ("When Congress has determined that an activity af-
fects interstate commerce, the courts need inquire only whether the finding is
rational."); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258-59
(1964) (stating the test for appropriate use of the commerce power asks "(1)
whether Congress had a rational basis for finding that racial discrimination
by motels affected commerce, and (2) if it had such a basis, whether the
means it selected to eliminate that evil are reasonable and appropriate");
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1964) ("[Wihere we find that
the legislators, in light of the facts and testimony before them, have a rational
basis for finding a chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of
commerce, our investigation is at an end.").
61. The dissenting Justices in Lopez argued that the deferential rational
basis review previously applied to Commerce Clause cases would have upheld
the GFSZA. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1657 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe Act in
question passes the rationality review that the Court continues to espouse.");
id. at 1661 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that Congress could have ration-
ally concluded that the gun possession's links to commerce were substantial).
62. See id. at 1631 (stating that the Court undertakes an independent
evaluation of constitutionality under the Commerce Clause); id. at 1629 n.2
("[Slimply because Congress may conclude that a particular activity substan-
tially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily make it so.") (quoting
Hodel, 452 U.S. at 311); Frickey, supra note 47, at 728 (noting that the Court
used a stringent variety of rational basis review); McJohn, supra note 37, at
28 (stating that the Court "abandoned its previous deference to Congress in
favor of its own independent assessment of the effect on commerce"); Merritt,
supra note 45, at 682-84 (claiming that the Court's level of review in Lopez
exceeded traditional rational basis, but fell below intermediate scrutiny).
Professor McJotn claims that Lopez deviated from precedent in two ways.
First, the Court asked not whether Congress had a rational basis for finding a
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C. CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO ENFORCE THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT
The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause
states, "[n]o State shall.., deny to any person within its ju-
risdiction the equal protection of the laws."" While the Equal
Protection Clause generally ensures that states treat similarly
situated people the same, states may legitimately make some
class-based distinctions.' Courts usually subject any class-
based distinction to rational basis review6 unless it involves
protected categories such as race, alienage, national origin, or
gender.6 6 If a classification involves gender, for example, the
courts apply intermediate scrutiny, which considers whether
the classification is substantially related to an important state
interest.67
As the Supreme Court recognized over 100 years ago, the
Equal Protection Clause protects individuals only from state
infringements of equal protection, not invasions by private citi-
zens.68 Despite the requirement of state action, the Amend-
sufficient nexus with commerce, but whether the regulated activity in fact
substantially affected interstate commerce. McJohn, supra note 37, at 28.
Second, instead of directly assessing arguments about how gun possession
could substantially affect interstate commerce, the Court focused on the
ramifications of accepting those arguments. Id. at 28-29.
63. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
64. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,
439 (1985) (stating the Equal Protection Clause commands that "persons
similarly situated should be treated alike").
65. Rational basis review is applied to all regulations that do not distin-
guish individuals based on their protected status (race, alienage, national
origin, and gender). Under this standard, courts consider whether the classi-
fication was rationally related to a legitimate state interest. See, e.g., id. at
440 ("The general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sus-
tained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legiti-
mate state interest.").
66. See, e.g., id. (stating that classifications based on protected status re-
quire heightened judicial scrutiny). Courts apply strict scrutiny to classifica-
tions based on race, alienage, and national origin. See, e.g., id. (listing cate-
gories to which courts apply strict scrutiny). Such regulations are upheld if
they are narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. See, e.g., id.(stating the strict scrutiny standard). Gender-based classifications are subject
to intermediate scrutiny. See infra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing
the intermediate standard of review).
67. For cases discussing the intermediate scrutiny standard and its appli-
cation to gender-based discrimination, see Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at
441; Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982); Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-99 (1976).
68. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883). The Court stated that
section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment "nullifies and makes void all State
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ment's protections can reach private conduct when it has suf-
ficient ties to the state. 9 Private conduct implicates state ac-
tion when the person who performed the act may "fairly be said
to be a state actor," and exercised a state-created right or
privilege, acted under imposition of the state, or acted under
the state's responsibility. 70
legislation, and State action of every kind ... which denies to any [United
States citizen] the equal protection of the laws." Id. The Civil Rights Cases
held unconstitutional portions of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 that criminal-
ized private actors' attempts to interfere on the basis of race with citizens'
right to enjoy public accommodations. Id. at 18. Congress asserted authority
to create the Act under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court
concluded that section 5 did not authorize creation of the Act because Con-
gress sought to regulate purely private conduct without identifying any state
action that violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 14. The Court also
recognized that the Act failed to correct any state violation of the Constitu-
tion. Id.
The Supreme Court has cited the state action requirement for violations
of section 1 with approval throughout the Fourteenth Amendment's history.
See, e.g., Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936-37 (1982) (applying
the state action requirement with approval); Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13
(1948) ("[A]ction inhibited by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment is
only such action as may fairly be said to be that of the States. That Amend-
ment erects no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory
or wrongful."); cf. POLYVIOs G. POLYVIOU, THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE
LAWS 540 (1980) (stating that "the doctrine of the Civil Rights Cases, namely
that the Equal Protection Clause only extends to governmental or state con-
duct, has not been seriously questioned, and is now firmly established"). The
state action requirement fulfills two basic purposes: (1) precluding the Consti-
tution from preempting individual liberties, and (2) recognizing the two prin-
cipals of division that organize our governmental structures, federalism and
separation of powers. TRIBE, supra note 24, § 18-2, at 1691.
69. Courts use three different tests to determine whether private conduct
is sufficiently connected to the state to implicate the protections of the Equal
Protection Clause. The "exclusive state function test" considers whether the
private actor is undertaking a task that has traditionally been handled exclu-
sively by the state. See, e.g., Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S.
614, 620-29 (1991) (finding state action in jury selection); Terry v. Adams, 345
U.S. 461, 468-70 (1953) (finding state action in private elections); Ronald J.
Krotoszynski, Jr., Back to the Briarpatch: An Argument in Favor of Constitu-
tional Meta-Analysis in State Action Determinations, 94 MICH. L. REV. 302,
318-19 (1995) (discussing the exclusive state function test). The "symbiotic
relationship test" considers whether the relationship between the government
and private party creates sufficient interdependence to warrant labeling the
private actor as one of the state. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722-24 (1961) (holding that a privately owned diner
renting space from a state-owned parking garage was a state actor); Kro-
toszynski, supra, at 319 (discussing the symbiotic relationship test). The
"nexus or compulsion test" considers whether the state encouraged or aided
the private actor's conduct. Id. at 320.
70. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937.
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In addition to section 1's self-executing protections,7 1 sec-
tion 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress the
authority to enact legislation to enforce the Amendment. Section
5 states that "Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropri-
ate legislation, the provisions of [the Fourteenth Amendment]""
and "is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Con-
gress to exercise its discretion in determining whether and
what legislation is needed to secure [its] guarantees."73 When
Congress identifies an equal protection violation by applying
judicially created standards of review to facts it has acquired,
its determination of whether an equal protection violation ex-
ists is entitled to significant judicial deference.7 4 Congress's
choice of a remedy is also entitled to judicial deference and will
be sustained if it is "plainly adapted" to enforcing the Amend-
ment and does not violate other constitutional limitations. 5
71. The Fourteenth Amendment section 1 prohibitions are judicially en-
forceable and do not require legislation to implicate its protections. See
TRIBE, supra note 24, § 18-1, at 1688 (discussing constitutional provisions that
are self-executing).
72. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. Each Civil War Amendment grants
Congress the power to enforce its respective protections. See id. amend. XIII,
§ 2 ("Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legisla-
tion."); id. amend. XV, § 2 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce this ar-
ticle by appropriate legislation.").
73. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966); cf. South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966) ("Congress [is] chiefly responsible for
implementing the rights created [under the Fifteenth Amendment].").
74. See Frickey, supra note 47, at 717 (stating that when Congress uses
judicially articulated standards to determine constitutionality, the Court will
give Congress substantial discretion in applying the standard to particular
facts).
75. The scope of congressional power under section 5 is defined by the
same formulation used to define the scope of congressional power under the
Necessary and Proper Clause. See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 650-51 (stating that a
Fourteenth Amendment section 5 enactment is constitutional if it enforces the
Equal Protection Clause, is plainly adapted to that end, and is consistent with
constitutional limitations); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1879)
("Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects
the [Civil War] amendments have in view... if not prohibited, is brought
within the domain of congressional power."); supra note 30 and accompanying
text (discussing the reach of congressional power under the Necessary and
Proper Clause); see also City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 175
(1980) (stating that congressional power under section 2 of the Fifteenth
Amendment is as broad as that under the Necessary and Proper Clause);
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 326 (stating that the test applied to Fifteenth
Amendment section 2 cases is the McCulloch test).
Unlike other constitutional provisions, the Tenth Amendment imposes
less stringent limitations on Congress's power to regulate under the Civil War
Amendments. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1125
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When Congress identifies Fourteenth Amendment violations, it
may regulate conduct that does not itself violate the Constitu-
tion so long as the regulation provides an appropriate remedy
to the equal protection concern.76 For example, in City of Rome
v. United States," the Court upheld legislation regulating con-
duct that had only a discriminatory impact on minority vot-
ing,"8 even though the conduct did not violate the Fifteenth
Amendment.79
(1996) (noting federal power to abrogate state immunity from suit under sec-
tion 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243
n.18 (1983) ("Congress is not limited by the same Tenth Amendment con-
straints [under the Fourteenth Amendment] that circumscribe the exercise of
its Commerce Clause powers."); City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 179-80 (stating that
congressional authority under the Civil War Amendments overrides federal-
ism concerns); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (holding that
Congress could provide for private suits against states or their officials under
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, even though such suits would be im-
permissible in other contexts). But cf. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 123-
26 (1970) (striking down regulation of state elections under section 5).
76. See City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 173-77 (holding that Congress could
regulate conduct that perpetuated the effects of past discrimination, even
though the regulated conduct did not violate the Constitution); see also
Frickey, supra note 47, at 717 (stating that Congress has the power to "adopt
overbroad prophylactic rules to protect against the violation of the standard").
77. 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
78. The City of Rome wanted to change its electoral system, but needed
pre-clearance from the Attorney General under the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
Id. at 160-62. The Attorney General denied clearance to some of the proposed
changes because he feared they could have a discriminatory effect. Id. at 162.
Despite finding that the changes were not made because of discriminatory in-
tent, the Court sustained application of the Act because the discriminatory
effects were sufficient to implicate the statute. Id. at 172.
79. The Court stated that it was unclear whether the Fifteenth Amend-
ment required proof of discriminatory intent, but assumed that it did for the
purposes of this decision. Id. at 173, 177; see also City of Mobile v. Bolden,
446 U.S. 55, 79 (1980) (upholding an at-large voting scheme despite the effect
on black voters). The Court wrote that "Congress could rationally have con-
cluded that, because electoral changes by jurisdictions with a demonstrable
history of intentional racial discrimination in voting create the risk of pur-
poseful discrimination, it was proper to prohibit changes that have a discrimi-
natory impact." City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 177 (citing Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at
335).
The grants of power embodied in section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
and section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment are substantially similar, so cases
addressing the scope of congressional power under either Amendment are
relevant to both. See, e.g., City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 207-08 n.1 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) ("[Tlhe nature of the enforcement powers conferred by the Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments has always been treated as coextensive.");
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 783-84 (1966) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(noting that the language of both Amendments is virtually the same and that
the courts should use the same standard to gauge the scope of congressional
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The Court recognized even broader congressional power in
Katzenbach v. Morgan. ° In Morgan, the Court stated that
Congress could not only identify Fourteenth Amendment vio-
lations by applying judicial standards of review to facts it had
acquired,8' but could create substantive rights that went be-
yond, or even conflicted with, judicial interpretations of rights
under the Amendment.82 In United States v. Guest,83 a major-
ity of the Court asserted, in dicta, an equally radical formula-
tion of Congress's ability to define Fourteenth Amendment
violations. In Guest, six Justices rejected previous cases re-
quiring state action for violations of legislation created under
authority for both); Douglas Laycock, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act,
1993 BYU L. REv. 221, 245-46 (stating that section 2 of the Fifteenth
Amendment and section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment have been similarly
interpreted); Rex E. Lee, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Legislative
Choice and Judicial Review, 1993 BYU L. REV. 73, 92 ("TIhe enforcement
powers of each of the reconstruction amendments are coextensive."). But cf.
Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Letting the Fox
into the Henhouse Under Cover of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 16
CARDOZO L. REV. 357, 376-77 (1994) (noting that the Fifteenth Amendment is
enforceable against federal and state governments, whereas the Fourteenth
Amendment is only enforceable against the states).
80. 384 U.S. at 652-56. In Morgan, New York voters challenged section
4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Id. at 643. The Act prohibited voting
restrictions based on an individual's inability to read or write if he or she had
completed sixth grade in a Puerto Rican school that did not have primarily
English instruction. Id. New York law required voters to be able to read and
write English to register, but it could not enforce the law against Puerto Rican
educated individuals under the federal statute. Id. at 643-44. The Court up-
held the statute as a valid exercise of congressional power under section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 658.
81. One theory on which the Court sustained section 4(e) was based on
Congress's ability to identify and remedy equal protection concerns using ju-
dicially formulated standards. The Court stated that Congress could have ra-
tionally concluded that, by giving Puerto Ricans a political tool via the right to
vote, section 4(e) provided a remedy to states' unconstitutional discriminatory
treatment in supplying government services. Id. at 652; see also TRIBE, supra
note 24, § 5-14, at 341 (discussing the Court's first theory in support of section
4(e)).
82. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 648. The Court's second theory for upholding
section 4(e) gave Congress the power to conclude that New York's literacy re-
quirement itself violated the Equal Protection Clause, despite the Court's
earlier conclusion that such literacy tests did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause. Compare Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S.
45, 50-53 (1959) (holding that literacy requirements did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause), with Morgan, 384 U.S. at 652-56 (upholding Congress's
regulation of literacy tests because Congress concluded that they violated the
Equal Protection Clause).
83. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
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Congress's section 5 powers.84 The six Justices asserted that
Congress could punish private conduct that interfered with
Fourteenth Amendment rights, even if a state actor did not
participate, if the regulation was reasonably necessary to fully
protect those rights. 5 Under this formulation of the section 5
power, Congress could regulate private conduct even in the ab-
sence of state action that violated the Equal Protection Clause.
Congress's authority to identify conduct that violates the
Fourteenth Amendment under judicially articulated standards
of review and its ability to apply broad remedies to those viola-
tions is well established.86 In contrast, congressional authority
to assert that conduct violates the Equal Protection Clause
when courts would not agree is uncertain. The Court has not
relied on Morgan's holding that Congress could create sub-
stantive rights beyond those that have been or would be judi-
cially recognized to sustain any legislation since its original
decision.8 7 Similarly, the Supreme Court has not had an oppor-
tunity to revisit the six Justices' assertion in Guest although
the Court did reaffirm that position in dicta in a subsequent
case.
88
84. Id. at 782 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In
Guest, the government indicted six defendants for conspiring to deprive a citi-
zen of his right to access public facilities in violation of 24 U.S.C. § 241 (1964).
Id. at 747 n.1. The majority opinion in Guest did not address whether state
action was a prerequisite to regulation under section 5 because it concluded
that the government's allegation of police action in this case was sufficient to
deny the defendants' motion to dismiss the indictments. Id. at 756. Justice
Brennan and five other Justices felt compelled to clarify that even if the gov-
ernment did not prove the alleged police action, the indictments should stand
because section 5 empowered Congress to act against wholly private conduct if
necessary to protect Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. at 782. The six Jus-
tices explicitly rejected the Civil Rights Cases's holding that required state
action for congressional enactments under section 5. Id. at 782-83. Justice
Brennan stated that the Civil Rights Cases's holding "reduces the legislative
power to enforce the provisions of the Amendment to that of the judiciary; and
it attributes a far too limited objective to the Amendment's sponsors." Id. at
783.
85. Id. at 782.
86. See, e.g., City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 173-77 (holding that Congress
could regulate conduct not violating the Equal Protection Clause to remedy a
previously identified equal protection violation).
87. See Frickey, supra note 47, at 716 (noting that the Court has never
relied on the Morgan power, although it has had opportunities to do so); see
also P.F. Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352, 1358-64 (1996) (challenging
the constitutionality of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act), cert. granted,
117 S. Ct. 293 (1997).
88. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 423-24 & n.8 (1973)
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D. THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT
In June 1990, Senator Biden proposed the Violence
Against Women Act in response to "the escalating problem of
violence against women." 9 After a heated four-year congres-
sional,9 ° executive, 9' and judicial92 debate of the legislation's
constitutionality, Congress passed the VAWA as part of the
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994."3
Subtitle C of the VAWA created a civil rights cause of action
against the perpetrators of gender-based crimes.9 4 Under the
("The Fourteenth Amendment itself 'erects no shield against merely private
conduct...' [but that] is not to say ... that Congress may not proscribe purely
private conduct under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.") (citing
Guest, 383 U.S. at 762, 782-84; Morgan, 384 U.S. at 652).
89. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 37 (1993).
90. Senators Thurmond and Hatch initially argued that the bill was un-
constitutional, but withdrew their objections after Senate hearings. Victoria
F. Nourse, Where Violence, Relationship, and Equity Meet: The Violence
Against Women Act's Civil Rights Remedy, 11 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 18 (1996).
91. The Bush administration's Department of Justice asserted that the
civil rights remedy was unconstitutional. Id. (citing letter from Department
of Justice to Chairman Joseph Biden 8 (Oct. 9, 1990)). The Clinton Depart-
ment of Justice believed that the remedy was constitutional. Id. (citing
Crimes of Violence Motivated by Gender: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d
Cong. 96 (1993) (statement of James P. Turner, Acting Assistant Attorney
General, Civil Rights Division)).
92. In 1992, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that he feared that the
VAWA's civil cause of action "could involve the federal courts in a whole host
of domestic relations disputes." 138 Cong. Rec. 746, 747 (Mar. 19, 1992). The
Judicial Conference also believed that the civil cause of action would impair
federal courts' ability to handle their caseloads and would "needlessly disrupt
long-established roles between the state and federal governments." See Wil-
liam G. Bassler, The Federalization of Domestic Violence: An Exercise in Co-
operative Federalism or a Misallocation of Federal Judicial Resources?, 48
RUTGERS L. REV. 1139, 1148 (1996) (citing JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.
AD Hoc COMM. ON GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE, REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE
OF THE UNITED STATES AND MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 8
(1991)). The Judicial Conference did not take a position on the 1993 version of
the VAWA, but it did reiterate its previously stated concerns about the Act
and the federalization of crime generally. Id. at 1148 n.46.
State court judges also opposed the VAWA in 1991 because they feared its
use as a bargaining tool in divorce cases. 1991 Hearings, supra note 15, at
315 (statement of the Conference of Chief Justices of the States).
93. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified as amended in scattered
titles of U.S.C.).
94. The civil remedy portion of the Act states, in part:
(c) Cause of action
A person ... who commits a crime of violence motivated by gen-
der... shall be liable to the party injured, in an action for the recov-
ery of compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and declara-
tory relief, and such other relief as a court may deem appropriate.
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VAWA's civil remedy, an individual who is the victim of a felony-
level crime" that is due in part to an animus based on the vic-
tim's gender may recover compensatory damages, punitive
damages, injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and attorney's
fees in federal or state courts.9
6
Congress claimed authority to enact this new cause of ac-
tion under the Commerce Clause and section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment.97  During Congress's four-year debate of
the VAWA, it made extensive findings, cited numerous studies,
and consulted a host of experts before determining that it had
(d) Definitions
For purposes of this section-
(1) the term "crime of violence motivated by gender" means a
crime of violence committed because of gender or on the basis of
gender, and due, at least in part, to an animus based on the vic-
tim's gender; and
(2) the term "crime of violence" means-
(A) an act or series of acts that would constitute a felony
against the person ... whether or not those acts have actually
resulted in criminal charges, prosecution, or conviction ....
42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
In addition to creating a new civil cause of action for gender-based crimes,
the Act allows the Attorney General to provide grants to states to implement
mandatory arrest programs, improve tracking of domestic violence cases, cen-
tralize handling of domestic violence cases among certain police, prosecutors
and judges, coordinate computer tracking systems, strengthen legal advocacy
for victims, educate judges about handling these cases, and improve victim
service programs. Id. § 2101, 108 Stat. at 1932 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3796hh
(1994)). The Act also strengthened penalties for certain sex crimes and re-
quired compensation for losses. Id. §§ 40502-05, 108 Stat. at 1945-48. For an
overview of the VAWA's other provisions, see Bassler, supra note 92, at 1142-
49.
95. The statute neither requires a criminal conviction, nor a criminal
complaint, to give rise to this civil cause of action. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(e)(2)
(1994). The alleged activity must only have the requisite elements of a felony
to bring suit. Id. § 13981(d)(2)(a). If a crime would constitute a felony but for
the perpetrator's relationship to the victim, the statute still creates a cause of
action. Id. § 13981(d)(2)(B).
96. Id. §§ 1988(b), 13981(c), (d) (1994). When a plaintiff brings an action
under the VAWA in state court, the defendant may not remove the case to
federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1445(d) (1994).
97. The VAWA states:
(a) Purpose
Pursuant to the affirmative power of Congress to enact this part un-
der section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, as
well as under section 8 of Article I of the Constitution, it is the pur-
pose of this part to protect the civil rights of victims of gender moti-
vated violence and to promote public safety, health, and activities af-
fecting interstate commerce by establishing a Federal civil rights
cause of action for victims of crimes of violence motivated by gender.
42 U.S.C. § 13981(a).
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constitutional authority to enact the civil rights provision.9 s
Citing statistics about the prevalence of domestic violence and
other abuses against women,99 Congress asserted that gender-
based crimes restrict movement, reduce employment opportu-
nities, increase health expenditures, and reduce consumer
spending, all of which affect interstate commerce and therefore
justify regulation under the Commerce Clause. 00 Congress
also claimed authority to create the civil remedy under section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment because it found that state
criminal justice systems were biased and discriminatory in
their treatment of gender-based crimes and, therefore, violated
the Equal Protection Clause. 1' For example, Congress found
98. In considering the VAWA between 1990 and 1994, Congress held no less
than six hearings on the topic of violence against women. These hearings in-
clude: Crimes of Violence Motivated by Gender: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d
Cong. (1993); Violence Against Women: Fighting the Fear: Hearing Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. (1993); Violence Against Women:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Criminal Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. (1992); 1991 Hearings, supra note 15;
Women and Violence: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st
Cong. (1990); Domestic Violence: Terrorism in the Home: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Children, Family, Drugs, and Alcoholism of the Senate Comm. on
Labor and Human Resources, 101st Cong. (1990). Congress also relied heavily
on the testimony of two law professors, Burt Neuborne and Cass Sunstein, in
assessing the civil rights remedy's constitutionality. See 1991 Hearings, supra
note 15, at 84-124 (statements of Professors Neuborne and Sunstein).
99. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (citing statistics on violence
against women).
100. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 54 (1993). The Conference report came to
similar conclusions:
[Cirimes of violence motivated by gender have a substantial adverse
effect on interstate commerce, by deterring potential victims from
traveling interstate, from engaging in employment in interstate busi-
ness, and from transacting with businesses, and in places involved, in
interstate commerce; crimes of violence motivated by gender have a
substantial adverse effect on interstate commerce, by diminishing
national productivity, increasing medical and other costs, and de-
creasing the supply of and the demand for interstate products;
H.R. CONF. REP NO. 103-711, at 385 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1801, 1853.
Congress estimated that $5 to $10 billion was spent each year for medical
care, criminal justice, and other costs related to domestic violence. S. REP.
No. 103-138, at 41 (1993). Studies also reported that 50% of rape victims lost
their jobs after the crime. Id. at 54.
101. The Senate Report highlighted the following findings:
(4) existing bias and discrimination in the criminal justice system of-
ten deprives victims of gender-motivated crimes of equal protection of
the laws and the redress to which they are entitled;
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that police, judges, and prosecutors treated crimes affecting
women less seriously than comparable crimes against men,
102
that "rape survivors must overcome problems of proof and local
prejudice that other crime victims need not hurdle,"10 3 and that
state and federal laws did not give victims of gender-motivated
violence the opportunity to vindicate their interests.104  Con-
gress also sought to remedy inadequate state laws 05 and rec-
(7) a Federal civil rights action as specified in this section is neces-
sary to guarantee equal protection of the laws...
(8) victims of gender-motivated violence have a right to equal protec-
tion of the laws, including a system of justice that is unaffected by
bias or discrimination and that, at every relevant stage, treats such
crimes as seriously as other violent crimes.
S. REP. No. 103-138, at 29 (1993); see also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711, at
385 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1801, 1853-54 (discussing the fail-
ures of state criminal justice systems in addressing gender-based crimes).
Congress also determined that "[tihe law enforcement response to the epi-
demic of violence against women has been inadequate." H. REP. No. 103-395,
at 27 (1993). Congress stated that its findings of inadequate response to gender-
motivated crimes belie claims that state laws provide adequate remedies for the
victims of these crimes. Id. Congress concluded that "[u]nder the 14th
Amendment, there is no clearer case of Congress's power to legislate than
when States have failed to provide equal rights." S. REP. No. 103-138, at 55
(1993); see also S. REP. NO. 102-197, at 42-48 (1991) (discussing the inade-
quacies of state remedies for gender-biased crimes); W.H. Hallock, The Vio-
lence Against Women Act: Civil Rights for Sexual Assault Victims, 68 IND. L.J.
577, 595-600 (1993) (describing the formal and informal barriers to equal
treatment of gender-based crimes).
Numerous state reports that identified their own discriminatory treat-
ment of gender-motivated violence bolstered the congressional findings. See,
e.g., Violence Against Women: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime and
Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 74 (1992)
(statement of Margaret Rosenbaum, Asst. State Atey, Miami, Fla.) (identifying
police bias against domestic abuse cases); 1991 Hearings, supra note 15, at
135-56 (statement of Gill Freeman) (reporting the identification of gender bias
in Florida's criminal justice system).
102. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 49 & n.52 (1993) (citing numerous state stud-
ies on gender-bias in state criminal justice systems).
103. S. REP. No. 102-197, at 53 (1991).
104. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994), reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1801, 1853.
105. Congress noted that existing laws prohibited gender-based crimes in
the workplace, but provided no similar protection in the home. S. REP. No.
103-138, at 29 (1993). Congress also found numerous legal barriers to protec-
tion from these crimes, including: corroboration and utmost resistance rules
in rape cases, spousal immunities for rape and battery, and jury instructions
that questioned the victim's credibility. S. REP. No. 102-197, at 44-45 (1991).
Congress noted that "[i]n theory, [a rape victim] has certain criminal and civil
remedies at her disposal" but found that "[iun practice, few are able to use
those remedies." Id. at 44. Furthermore, Congress determined that state and
federal laws were inadequate to protect against the bias element of gender-
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ognize the importance of a victim's right to be free from gender-
motivated violence in the absence of appropriate state recogni-
tion of that right. 10 6
E. DOE V. DOE: UPHOLDING THE VAWA UNDER THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE
Doe v. Doe was the first reported case addressing the con-
stitutionality of the VAWA's civil rights remedy.0 7 In Doe, the
United States District Court for the District of Connecticut up-
held the Act against a Commerce Clause challenge.0 8 Because
the court found that the Commerce Clause authorized Con-
gress to enact the VAWA, it did not consider the defendant's
Fourteenth Amendment argument. ,0 9
The Doe court considered whether Congress could ration-
ally conclude that the VAWA's civil rights remedy regulated
activity that substantially affected interstate commerce. ° The
court applied this deferential rational basis standard of review,
rejecting the defendant's argument that Lopez required use of
a less deferential standard."' Applying the rational basis
standard, the court concluded that the statistical, medical, and
economic data compiled by Congress provided it with a rational
basis for concluding that gender-based crimes substantially af-
fected interstate commerce.) 2 The court found that the VAWA
regulated an activity that impacted interstate commerce as
much as the Agricultural Adjustment Act did in Wickard"I and
based crimes. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 103-711, at 385, reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1853.
106. The Act provides "a special societal judgment that crimes motivated
by gender bias are unacceptable because they violate the victims' civil rights."
S. REP. No. 103-138, at 50 (1993).
107. Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996).
108. Id. at 617.
109. Id. at 612 n.5.
110. Id. at 612. The Doe court limited its analysis to the third category of
regulable activities identified in Lopez because the defendant relied on that
category for his objection to the Act. Id.
111. Id. at 612-13. The court stated that its review was limited to deter-
mining whether "a rational basis existed for concluding that a regulated activ-
ity sufficiently affected interstate commerce." Id. at 612. The court acknowl-
edged that its review, though independent, would consider congressional
findings. Id. Ultimately, the court rejected defendant's argument to use a
more searching standard of review, stating that Lopez reaffirmed the Hodel
rationality test. Id. at 613 (citing United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624,
1629 (1995)).
112. Id. at 615.
113. Id. at 614. The court stated that the repetitive impact of women lim-
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did not require the court to "pile inference upon inference" to
reach that conclusion. 14  The court also rejected the defen-
dant's argument that the Act infringed on traditional state po-
lice powers and federalized criminal, family, and state tort
law.'15 The court stated that the VAWA did not encroach on
these areas of state control, but rather complemented state
initiatives in these areas and ensured full protection of civil
rights. 16 After determining that Congress had a rational basis
for enacting the VAWA, the court found the Act "reasonably
adapted to its intended end." 17 The court agreed with Con-
gress's findings that state and federal laws inadequately pro-
tected against gender-based crimes and that biases existed in
the criminal justice system against victims of gender-based
crime. 18 Based on these findings, the court concluded that the
VAWA constituted a reasonable measure designed to deter and
punish perpetrators of gender-based crimes and, therefore, was
reasonably adapted to a legitimate constitutional end."9
H. BRZONKALA: REJECTING CONGRESSIONAL
AUTHORITY TO ENACT THE VAWA
In Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State Univer-
sity,120 the District Court for the Western District of Virginia
held that Congress lacked constitutional authority to enact the
VAWA under either the Commerce Clause or section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 2 ' Based on these findings, the court
dismissed the plaintiffs civil action against the men she ac-
iting their participation in the workplace would result in an impact on inter-
state commerce as substantial as the growing of wheat in Wickard. Id.
114. Id. The defendant argued that Congress's justifications for enacting
the VAWA were similar to the rationales dismissed in Lopez, namely the "cost
of crime" and "national productivity" arguments. Id. at 613. The court re-
jected this argument because it had already concluded that Lopez did not alter
the standard of review and found that Congress had demonstrated a need for
the regulation that satisfied this standard. Id. The court also stated that the
defendant based his argument on selective Supreme Court statements taken
out of context. Id. (citing United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 685 (11th Cir.
1995)).
115. Id. at 615-16.
116. Id. at 616.
117. Id.
118. Id.; see supra notes 101-106 and accompanying text (discussing con-
gressional findings regarding the need for the VAWA).
119. Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 616.
120. 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va.), appeal docketed, No. 96-2316 (4th Cir.
Sept. 24, 1996).
12L Id. at 801.
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cused of sexually assaulting her and struck down the VAWA
civil rights remedy.
122
A. THE VAWA: THE GFSZA's COMMERCE CLAUSE TWIN
The Brzonkala court first concluded that neither of the
first two categories of regulable activities identified in Lopez1
23
could sustain the VAWA because it did not regulate the use of
channels of interstate commerce or instrumentalities of inter-
state commerce. 12 4 The court analyzed the GFSZA under the
third prong of regulable activities, compared the characteris-
tics of the GFSZA and the VAWA, and concluded that the lat-
ter was also unconstitutional. 125 Although the court recognized
that the VAWA differed from the GFSZA in its civil nature,
abundant legislative history, and fewer steps of causation, 126 it
deemed these differences insignificant. 127 First, the court dis-
missed the usefulness of congressional findings supporting the
VAWA, emphasizing the court's need to make an independent
evaluation of the regulation's nexus to interstate commerce
rather than relying on Congress's assertions and conclusions. 128
Second, the court found irrelevant the civil/criminal distinction
between the VAWA and the GFSZA because the VAWA also
involved activities criminal in nature. 2 9 Finally, the court
found that the chain of causation from the regulated activity to
the effect on commerce was only one step less in the VAWA. 130
122. Id.
123. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text (discussing the first two
categories of regulable activity identified in Lopez).
124. Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 786. The court admitted that women and
their abusers often travel between states, but concluded that the Commerce
Clause required more than this to justify federal regulation under the second
category of regulable activities. Id.
125. Id. at 786-93.
126. Id. at 789.
127. Id.
128. Id. The court recognized that congressional findings were helpful in
determining a regulated activity's nexus to interstate commerce, but said such
findings were not required. Id. The court stated that if the Lopez Court had
considered such findings important, it could have considered the congres-
sional findings made after the GFSZA's passage. Id. The court claimed that
the Lopez Court did not need to consider those findings because it felt it had
sufficient information to make its decision without them. Id.
129. Id. at 790.
130. Id. The court compared Congress's arguments in support of the
VAWA to those advanced in Lopez. Id. The court noted that the GFSZA
regulated an activity that could lead to violent crime, while the VAWA regu-
lated an activity that was itself a violent crime. Id. The court dismissed this
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The court criticized use of a "steps test" and stated that the
most important consideration was the proximity of the regu-
lated activity to interstate commerce. 3 1  The court then de-
termined that gender-based crimes were as remote from inter-
state commerce as was the possession of a gun in a school
zone.
132
While finding the statutes' differences insignificant, the
court found the similarities convincing. 33 The court noted that
the statutes were similar in that they were both criminal,
noneconomic, lacked a jurisdictional requirement, were re-
motely connected to commerce, and were supported by ration-
ales that would result in excessive congressional power. 134 The
court determined that the VAWA did not regulate an economic
activity because it regulated local criminal activity, not the
"growth of crops, the shipment of goods, or other similar eco-
nomic activities."'35 The court found the VAWA's noneconomic
character significant because it noted that Lopez focused heav-
ily on whether legislation regulated economic activity. 3 ' The
court asserted that "Lopez teaches that cases in which the
statute at issue regulates intrastate activity which is economic
in nature are analyzed differently from cases involving
noneconomic intrastate activity."137  Consequently, the court
stated that Wickard and other cases addressing regulations of
economic activity were not applicable to the VAWA because of
its non-economic character. 38 The court also noted that the
VAWA lacked a jurisdictional element that required the regu-
lated conduct to somehow involve interstate commerce. 39 Fi-
distinction, stating that the difference was "not enough to apply the commerce
power in the case at hand" because the "step from possession of a firearm in
schools to the commission of a violent crime is a small step." Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 791.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 789.
135. Id. at 791.
136. Id. The court noted that whether a regulation controls economic in-
trastate activity is a valid consideration after Lopez. Id. The court observed
that Doe upheld the VAWA against a Commerce Clause challenge and criti-
cized its comparison of the VAWA to the regulation in Wickard. Id. The court
stated that comparison of the Court's treatment of the Wickard regulation to
the VAWA was inappropriate because Wickard involved an economic activity
whereas the VAWA did not. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 791-92.
139. Id. at 792. The court gave examples of commerce-based regulations
that contained a jurisdictional requirement, including the Mann Act and Title
1997] 1625
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nally, the court concluded that upholding the VAWA because of
the effect gender-based crime has on the national economy
would permit Congress to reach family and most criminal mat-
ters because they too eventually affect the national economy. 140
The court stated that this rationale would impermissibly alter
the balance of power between the federal and state govern-
ments. 141 After comparing the statutes, the court concluded
that the VAWA suffered from the same fatal flaws as the
GFSZA and rejected plaintiffs arguments to sustain the
VAWA under the Commerce Clause. 142
B. TARGETING THE WRONG CONDUCT TO REMEDY A
LEGITIMATE EQUAL PROTECTION CONCERN
The Brzonkala court also found Congress's Fourteenth
Amendment section 5 argument unpersuasive 4 1 While ac-
knowledging that private conduct might have sufficient ties to
the state to bring it under the state action requirement of the
Equal Protection Clause, the court stated that the Amendment
only reaches conduct involving state action. 1' The court ac-
knowledged the Guest assertion that section 5 allowed Con-
gress to reach purely private conduct, but dismissed that ar-
gument because the court deemed it contrary to the Fourteenth
Amendment's plain language and the Civil Rights Cases.145
VII of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. Id. The
court noted that it was unclear whether a jurisdictional requirement was
mandatory, but stated that Congress frequently used such requirements in
similar legislation. Id.
140. Id. The court stated that the plaintiff mistakenly interchanged
"effects on the national economy" with "effects on interstate commerce" in her
assertion that gender-based crimes have sufficient impact on interstate com-
merce to justify federal regulation. Id. The court noted that the two are not
the same, even though something that affects the national economy eventu-
'ally affects interstate commerce. Id. The court said that such a chain of cau-
sation alone was not sufficient to bring a statute within the scope of the com-
merce power. Id.
141. Id. at 793.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 801.
144. Id. at 793-94. The court noted that even though private conduct may
be sufficiently linked to state action, some state involvement is required, even
if it is tangential. Id. at 794.
145. Id. (citing The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883)). The court
claimed that a prior Supreme Court case required that lower courts not as-
sume that the Supreme Court's contrary indications implicitly overruled
precedents requiring state action. Id. (citing Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shear-
son/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989)). The court also noted
that cases after Guest cited the Civil Rights Cases's holding with approval as
1626 [Vol. 81:1601
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In order to withstand a constitutional challenge, the court
stated that legislation enacted under section 5 must use le-
gitimate means to remedy a legitimate equal protection con-
cern.'46 The court identified the Act's purposes as attacking
gender-motivated crimes and remedying biases in state crimi-
nal justice systems.1 47 The court held that the purpose of at-
tacking an individual's gender-based crime lacked sufficient
ties to the state to create a legitimate equal protection concern
because the perpetrators of those crimes do not act pursuant to
a state granted right or privilege.14 1 Moreover, the court con-
cluded, these crimes could not be attributed to the states be-
cause states prohibit these crimes under their criminal and
tort laws. 149
In contrast, the court found the purpose of remedying dis-
crimination in state criminal justice systems to constitute a
legitimate equal protection concern. 5° After making this de-
termination, the court examined whether the VAWA provided
an appropriate remedy to that concern.' 5' The court found that
the Act did not provide a legitimate remedy to this concern be-
cause it did not stop, undo, or punish the state's equal protec-
tion violation.152 Because the Act created a cause of action
against private conduct and not for states' discriminatory ac-
tions, the court determined that it could not sustain the Act as
a legitimate remedy to state discrimination.'53 In addition, the
court found that the remedy was both over- and underbroad.
The court concluded that the Act's remedy was overbroad be-
cause it created a cause of action for victims who did not suffer
recently as 1982. Id. (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936
(1982)). Morgan was not applicable to the VAWA, the court reasoned, because
it involved congressional action against the state, whereas the VAWA acts
against purely private conduct. Id. at 795.
146. Id. at 796-97.
147. Id. at 797.
148. Id.
149. Id. (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 938 (1982)).
The court stated, "Certainly the state is not responsible in any relevant sense
for individuals who commit violent crimes against women." Id. The Court
concluded that the perpetrator's gender-motivated crime constituted one act
of discrimination, and the state's discriminatory enforcement of its laws
against these crimes constituted a separate discriminatory act. Id.
150. id. at 800. The court noted that states' differential treatment of gender-
based crimes might stem from gender discrimination and, therefore, create an






an equal protection violation by the state.'5 4 The court deter-
mined that the remedy was underbroad because it did not
provide a cause of action for female victims of non-gender-
based crimes who were denied equal protection by a state's bi-
ased criminal justice system.'55 Because the court determined
that the VAWA remedied conduct not giving rise to an equal
protection concern and was over- and underbroad, the court
concluded that the Act did not constitute a valid use of Con-
gress's section 5 powers.1
56
III. THE VAWA: A LEGITIMATE USE OF
CONGRESSIONAL POWER
A. VAWA's INSUFFICIENT NExus WITH INTERSTATE COMMERCE
1. Applicable Category of Regulable Activity
Although Congress may regulate three categories of ac-
tivities under the Commerce Clause, 57 the VAWA is only po-
tentially sustainable as a regulation of activity having a sub-
stantial impact on interstate commerce. 5 In addition to
finding that gender-based crimes substantially affect interstate
commerce, Congress found that high incidents of gender-
motivated violence reduced women's willingness to travel,159
which could bring the Act into the category of regulations of
persons in interstate commerce.1 60 That argument, however, is
identical to the government's argument in Lopez,' 6' which the
154. Id. The court used the example of a woman who was raped and whose
perpetrator received the maximum penalty. Id. The court noted that this
woman, who did not suffer from a denial of her equal protection rights, could
still recover under the Act. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 800-01.
157. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text (discussing the catego-
ries of regulable activity identified in Lopez).
158. See supra note 35 and accompanying text (identifying the third cate-
gory of regulable activity under the Commerce Clause).
159. See supra note 100 (noting that Congress found that gender-based
crimes deter interstate travel).
160. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing the second cate-
gory of regulable activities identified in Lopez).
161. Brief for the United States at 18, United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct.
1624 (1994) (No. 93-1260) ("[V]iolent crime affects interstate commerce by re-
ducing the willingness of other individuals to travel to areas within the coun-
try that are perceived to be unsafe.").
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Court summarily rejected. 62 Accepting this argument could
justify federal regulation of "all violent crime[s] ... regardless
of how tenuously they relate to interstate commerce." 6 3 As a
result, courts should reject arguments to sustain the VAWA as
a regulation of persons in interstate commerce.'6
2. Judicial Review Under the Commerce Clause
Lopez mandates that courts independently evaluate whether
Congress's assertion that gender-based crimes substantially affect
interstate commerce was rational. 65 Courts should consider
and give weight to findings supporting Congress's argument
that gender-based crimes have a substantial effect on inter-
state commerce, 166 but should decide whether those purported
links in fact provide the requisite nexus to commerce to permit
regulation under the Commerce Clause.'67
3. Regulation of Noneconomic Activities
The Brzonkala court correctly determined that the VAWA
does not regulate an economic or commercial activity. Lopez
dictates that regulations of intrastate activities must involve a
commercial or economic activity, or contribute to an economic
regulatory scheme that would be undercut in the absence of the
regulation, to "be sustained under ... cases upholding regula-
tions of activities that arise out of or are connected with a
commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, sub-
162. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630.
163. Id. at 1632.
164. Both courts that have addressed the VAWA's constitutionality under
the Commerce Clause have only analyzed it as potentially regulating an activ-
ity substantially affecting interstate commerce. See supra notes 110, 124 and
accompanying text (noting that both courts did not analyze the VAWA under
the first or second categories of regulable activities identified in Lopez). For
an argument that the VAWA is sustainable as a regulation of persons in in-
terstate commerce, see Kerrie E. Maloney, Note, Gender-Motivated Violence
and the Commerce Clause: The Civil Rights Provision of the Violence Against
Women Act After Lopez, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1876, 1935-39 (1996).
165. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (noting that the Lopez
Court considered whether the gun possession in fact substantially affected
interstate commerce).
166. See supra text accompanying note 51 (noting that courts consider
congressional findings when reviewing a statute's constitutionality under the
Commerce Clause).
167. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (stating that the Court in
Lopez undertook an independent evaluation of whether gun possession sub-
stantially affected interstate commerce).
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stantially affects interstate commerce." 168 The VAWA fails to
meet this requirement because gender-based crimes do not in-
volve a "commercial" transaction or "economic" activity, as the
Court has used those terms. 169 Rather, gender-based crimes
are similar to possession of a gun in a school zone, which the
Court has defined as a noneconomic activity. 10 The gender-
motivated criminal does not produce goods, purchase services,
or take part in any sort of economic or commercial transaction
that the Court has identified as being within the scope of con-
gressional power to regulate under the Commerce Clause.' 71 In
addition, there is no national market for gender-motivated
violence like there is for wheat and other products and services
regulated under the Commerce Clause. 172 While an extremely
broad definition of "commerce" or "economic" could encompass
gender-based crimes,'73 the Lopez Court intended a more re-
strictive use of these terms.
The majority in Lopez rejected the view that Congress
could have concluded that schools were a commercial enter-
prise because this reasoning would impose no limit on the
definition of "commercial" and would allow regulation of every
aspect of local schools.'74 Similarly, an argument that gender-
based crimes are economic because they eventually impact in-
terstate commerce would allow Congress to regulate nearly any
criminal activity because they cause individuals or society
harm. Situations where the Court upheld regulations of crimi-
nal activities are distinguishable because they involved activi-
ties that themselves had a commercial or economic character,
such as credit transactions.'75 The Court did not intend a
broad definition of economic activities that would encompass
168. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1631 (1995).
169. See id. at 1630 (listing intrastate activities involving economic activ-
ity).
170. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's
holding that the GFSZA did not regulate an economic activity).
171. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630 (listing regulated intrastate activities
involving economic activity that the Court has sustained under the commerce
power).
172. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text (discussing Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)).
173. See supra note 49 (discussing the Court's statement that a broad
definition of "commercial" could include "any activity").
174. See supra note 49 (discussing the Court's treatment of Justice
Breyer's dissenting arguments).
175. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 157 (1971) (upholding
regulation of extortionate credit transactions).
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gender-based violence. The Brzonkala court, therefore, correctly
concluded that gender-based crimes did not constitute an eco-
nomic activity.
4. The VAWA's Less Than Substantial Effect on Interstate
Commerce
Because gender-based crimes do not constitute an economic
activity, cases addressing the constitutionality of regulations
controlling intrastate economic activities are inapplicable.1 6
Consequently, Congress cannot rely on cases like Wickard to es-
tablish gender-based crimes' nexus to interstate commerce.
Even if the nexus between gender-motivated violence and inter-
state commerce could justify congressional regulation if a court
did aggregate its effects, without aggregation the substantiality
of each individual crime's effect on interstate commerce is insuf-
ficient to meet the substantiality requirement for Commerce
Clause enactments. While a gender-based crime may cause the
victim to stop working, reduce her consumption of goods, or
cause her to seek medical attention, those effects, considered in
isolation from people similarly situated, do not have a
"substantial impact" on interstate commerce when compared to
activities or enterprises previously regulated and sustained un-
der the Commerce Clause.'77 Interpreting the substantial effects
test to include one victim's potential impact on interstate com-
merce would significantly constrain the requirement and would
contradict the Court's assertion in Lopez that required the effect
on interstate commerce to be "substantial."7 Accepting such an
argument would allow Congress to "use a relatively trivial im-
pact on commerce as an excuse for broad general regulation of
state or private activities."17 9
176. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631 (stating that regulations of noneconomic
intrastate activities cannot be sustained under cases arising out of or con-
nected with commercial transactions).
177. All of the regulations cited in Lopez with approval as appropriate
regulations of intrastate economic activity involved regulation of whole indus-
tries, similarly situated restaurants or motels nationwide, nationwide loan-
sharking, or other large enterprises. Id. at 1630. None of the enactments in-
volved regulation of an individual person, whose act, viewed in isolation, was
found to substantially affect interstate commerce.
178. See supra note 45 (noting that the Court clarified that a "substantial"
effect on interstate commerce was necessary to justify regulation under the
Commerce Clause).




The VAWA not only fails to regulate an activity having a
substantial effect on interstate commerce, but Congress's as-
serted nexus between gender-motivated violence and interstate
commerce is too tenuous to justify congressional regulation. As
in Lopez, the implications of accepting Congress's rationales in
support of the VAWA create significant federalism concerns.
1 80
In fact, Congress used some of the same rationales rejected in
Lopez to support the VAWA. 18 1 Congress's assertions that
gender-based crimes reduce employment opportunities, restrict
movement, and reduce consumer spending are as objectionable
as the arguments rejected in Lopez because they, too, could
justify federal regulation of areas traditionally controlled by
the states. One could say that nearly any criminal activity has
those effects, 182 but as the Court stated in Lopez, such effects
are too remote from interstate commerce to justify congres-
sional regulation without a further connection to interstate
commerce. 83 The only difference between the GFSZA's ra-
tionales and those argued in support of the VAWA is that the
former relied on a potential violent crime, whereas the latter
relied on an actual violent crime. 84 This difference is insignifi-
cant because either rationale would allow Congress to intrude
on the traditional state power to regulate crime.'85 While the
VAWA is arguably not as intrusive as the GFSZA,18 6 the
Court's concern in Lopez was about the implications of accept-
180. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's
concern in Lopez about the government's arguments in support of the
GFSZA).
181. Compare supra note 100 (citing the House report claiming gender-
based crimes have a substantial impact on interstate commerce because they
"diminish... national productivity"), with supra notes 55-56 and accompany-
ing text (rejecting the government's national productivity argument in sup-
port of the GFSZA).
182. For instance, locales with high crime rates are less attractive and re-
duce travel and employment in those areas.
183. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text (rejecting the govern-
ment's national productivity argument).
184. Compare supra text accompanying note 55 (discussing the govern-
ment's national productivity argument), with supra note 100 and accompany-
ing text (discussing Congress's asserted bases for implementing the VAWA
under the Commerce Clause).
185. See supra text accompanying note 58 (discussing the Court's rejection
of the cost of crime rationale).
186. The VAWA does not supplant state criminal law as the GFSZA did,
but it does regulate criminal activity. Arguably, the Act also interferes with
state family law. See supra note 92 (discussing the judiciary's objections to
the VAWA's civil rights remedy because of its intrusion on state family law).
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ing the asserted rationales in support of legislation.'87 Because
the VAWA regulates noneconomic activities, lacks a jurisdic-
tional requirement that would tie gender-based crimes to in-
terstate commerce, and relies on rationales that could raise
significant federalism concerns, courts should not sustain the
Act under Congress's Commerce Clause authority.
B. CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO ATTACK GENDER-BASED CRIMES
UNDER SECTION 5
1. Identifying an Equal Protection Concern
Congress stated that its purpose in enacting the VAWA
was to "protect the civil rights of victims of gender motivated
violence." 88 To demonstrate a need for this legislation, Con-
gress compiled an extensive record exposing the biases, inade-
quacies, and rampant discrimination in the way state criminal
justice systems treat gender-based crimes. 189 These problems
constitute state action because the state or state officials are
perpetrating discrimination through their differential applica-
tion of state laws. 9 ° Because the discriminatory conduct that
Congress identified provides support for its conclusion that
states are discriminating on the basis of gender, courts would
inquire whether the states were advancing an important gov-
ernmental interest through this differential treatment. 191 No
state, however, has advanced an important reason for its dis-
criminatory and inadequate enforcement of laws proscribing
gender-based crimes. States have even acknowledged that
they have systemic problems that prevent them from ade-
quately addressing these crimes. 92 The Brzonkala court,
187. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632 ("[Ihf we were to accept the Govern-
ment's arguments, we are hard-pressed to posit any activity by an individual
that Congress is without power to regulate."); see also supra note 59 (noting
that the Court focused on the ramifications of accepting the governmenfs ar-
guments).
188. See supra note 97 (quoting the VAWA's purpose statement).
189. See supra notes 101-104 and accompanying text (reviewing Congress's
findings regarding biases, inadequacies, and discrimination in state criminal
justice systems).
190. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (noting the Equal Protection
Clause only protects individuals from discriminatory state acts).
191. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (stating that gender-based
distinctions require an important governmental interest).
192. See supra notes 101-102 (referencing state studies that demonstrated
state discrm:ination and inadequate treatment of gender-based crimes).
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therefore, properly concluded that a legitimate equal protection
concern exists regarding states' differential treatment of gender-
based crimes. 93
Although the Supreme Court has held that section 5 al-
lows Congress to define conduct that violates equal protection
even when the courts would disagree, 194 Congress did not need
to rely on this broad reading of its power to enact the VAWA.
95
Congress's finding of discriminatory state treatment of gender-
motivated crimes was sufficient to satisfy judicial standards for
identifying equal protection violations because states cannot
identify an important governmental interest served by their
gender-based discrimination. 96 Since Congress made exten-
sive findings demonstrating state discrimination and applied
judicially created standards to identify an equal protection
concern, its conclusions are entitled to judicial deference.1 97
2. The Breadth of Congressional Remedies Under Section 5
While the Brzonkala court recognized that Congress had
identified a legitimate equal protection concern in states' dif-
ferential treatment of gender-based crimes, it determined that
Congress's remedy did not sufficiently address that concern.
1 98
The court was incorrect, however, because the VAWA provides
a remedy to states' deprivations of equal treatment by provid-
ing the victim with her day in court independent of the states'
discriminatory systems, compensating victims for their inju-
ries, deterring perpetrators from committing acts that are
causally related to the states' equal protection violations, and
providing "a special societal judgment that crimes motivated
by gender bias are unacceptable because they violate the vic-
193. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State Univ., 935 F. Supp
779, 800 (W.D. Va.) (recognizing a legitimate equal protection concern in
states' differential treatment of gender-based crimes), appeal docketed, No.
96-2316 (4th Cir. Sept. 24, 1996).
194. See supra note 82 and accompanying text (noting Congress's ability to
define substantive rights under its section 5 powers).
195. See supra note 87 and accompanying text (noting that Congress's
rights-creating power under Morgan is questionable).
196. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (describing the standard
applied to classifications based on gender).
197. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (noting the deference given
to congressional determinations of constitutionality when applying court-
made standards).
198. See supra text accompanying notes 152-153 (stating that the
Brzonkala court found that the VAWA did not remedy the equal protection
concern).
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tim's civil rights."199 Although the Act does not ensure that
perpetrators of gender-motivated violence will face criminal
sanctions, it vindicates victims' interests independent of the
states' discriminatory systems and, therefore, provides victims
with a remedy to states' equal protection violations.
The Brzonkala court's assertion that the Act should have
targeted the states who were violating the Equal Protection
Clause is not supported by precedent, fails to recognize the
breadth of congressional power to formulate remedies, and im-
permissibly supplants the court's judgment for that of Con-
gress. Although the VAWA's civil remedy does not directly at-
tack the states' discrimination, there is no precedent that
imposes such a limitation on Congress's choice of remedies. In
fact, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that Congress can
target conduct that does not violate the Constitution if the
regulation provides an appropriate remedy to an equal protec-
tion concern.20 The VAWA's civil rights remedy is analogous
to the regulation upheld in City of Rome because they both tar-
get conduct that does not violate the Constitution and both
provide a remedy for a congressionally identified equal protec-
tion concern.20 1 While Congress could have employed several
potential remedies to address this equal protection concern, its
choice was entitled to substantial deference if the court could
"perceive a basis upon which the Congress might resolve the
conflict as it did."0 2 For example, Congress might have be-
lieved that creating a cause of action against the states was
imprudent because it could disturb prosecutorial discretion if
victims threatened to sue the state regardless of how strong
their cases were against alleged perpetrators. 23  Instead of
199. See supra notes 101-106 and accompanying text (identifying the
problems Congress sought to address with the VAWA's civil cause of action).
200. See supra note 76 and accompanying text (noting that Congress can
regulate constitutionally permissible conduct to remedy an equal protection
concern).
20L See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text (discussing City of
Rome).
202. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 653 (1966); see also supra notes
74-76 and accompanying text (discussing the deference given to Congress's
determination of when an equal protection violation exists and how to remedy
it).
203. See Brief for Intervenor-Appellant United States at *14, Brzonkala v.
Virginia Polytechnic and State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va.) (No. Civ. A.
95-1358-R) (stating that a cause of action against the state or state officials
"would fly in the face of prosecutorial immunity"), appeal docketed, No. 96-2316
(4th Cir. Sept. 24, 1996) (visited Mar. 17, 1997) <httpJ/www.soconline.org/
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using this extremely intrusive remedy, Congress chose to cre-
ate a private cause of action that defends victims' interests
against the states' discriminatory systems and devoted $1.6
billion to help states improve those systems and services to
victims of these crimes. 2°4 Because Congress chose a collateral
remedy that addresses an equal protection concern instead of
more intrusive alternatives, courts should view Congress's
choice as a rational one and sustain the VAWA's civil rights
remedy under their deferential review of Congress's constitu-
tional authority to enact remedial legislation.
3. Constitutional Limits on Section 5 Authority
While the Supreme Court has never endorsed or refuted
use of the section 5 power to regulate private conduct as a rem-
edy to state equal protection violations, °5 Supreme Court de-
cisions and policy rationales provide support for such a use of
the section 5 power. Allowing Congress to regulate private
conduct does not impermissibly intrude on state police powers
because the Fourteenth Amendment empowers Congress to in-
terfere with state sovereignty to enforce its guarantees. 26 That
authority, though not absolute, justifies creating a federal civil
cause of action against perpetrators of gender-based crimes be-
cause the federal government is the principal enforcer of civil
rights and may implement whatever regulations are "necessary"
to protect those rights.2 7 Allowing Congress to regulate private
conduct to remedy an equal protection concern would not cre-
ate an unlimited abrogation of state police power because Con-
gress may only regulate private conduct to remedy an identi-
fied state equal protection violation.20 8 This case presents an
even stronger justification for congressional regulation of pri-
vate conduct because it involves public and private invidious
LEGAL/BRZONKAJA/111896.html> [hereinafter Brief for United States].
204. See supra notes 17, 94 and accompanying text (discussing the Act's
civil rights remedy and other provisions to help states remedy their treatment
of gender-based crimes).
205. The Supreme Court's holding in the Civil Rights Cases is distinguish-
able from the present case because Congreiss identified a state violation of
equal protection and sought to remedy that violation with the VAWA. See su-
pra note 68 (discussing the Civil Rights Cases).
206. See supra note 75 (discussing Congress's ability to subvert federalism
principles to enforce the Amendment's guarantees).
207. See supra note 75 (discussing the breadth of congressional power to
remedy equal protection violations).
208. See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text (discussing equal pro-
tection violations).
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discrimination against a protected class.209 Moreover, allowing
Congress to create a private cause of action to promote civil
rights in these limited situations is equally, if not less, intru-
sive than Congress's already recognized power to overrun state
immunity in such situations.21 0 Instead of creating a cause of
action that directly impinges on state sovereignty, the VAWA
provides a supplemental remedy that minimally interferes
with state interests.
The Court's recognition of Congress's power to regulate
purely private conduct that interferes with Fourteenth Amend-
ment rights provides additional support for the proposition that
Congress may regulate private conduct to enforce Fourteenth
Amendment rights when the state's conduct causes the depri-
vation.21' Allowing Congress to regulate private conduct to
remedy a state's identified violation of the Equal Protection
Clause presents fewer constitutional concerns than does regu-
lation of any private activity that might interfere with Four-
teenth Amendment rights. In the latter situation, Congress
could regulate numerous private acts that interfere with a pro-
tected right, even in the absence of state misconduct. In the
former situation, Congress could regulate private conduct only
after it identified a state's violation of equal protection rights.
If the federal government can regulate private conduct in the
absence of state misconduct, it should also have the authority
to regulate private conduct if it provides an appropriate remedy
to an identified state equal protection deprivation. Even if the
Court rejects the Guest proposition that Congress can regulate
private conduct that interferes with Fourteenth Amendment
rights,212 the Court decisions and policy rationales mentioned
above provide support for Congress's ability to reach private
conduct if appropriate to remedy a state's equal protection
violation.
209. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (noting that gender classifi-
cations are subject to intermediate scrutiny); cf. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403
U.S. 88, 102 (1971) (noting the importance of limiting federal causes of action
to specific activities, such as class-based invidious discrimination, to avoid
constitutional problems).
210. See supra note 75 (noting Congress's ability to override state sover-
eign immunity for Fourteenth Amendment violations).
21L See supra notes 84, 88 and accompanying text (discussing United
States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966), and District of Columbia v. Carter, 409
U.S. 418 (1973)).
212. See supra text accompanying note 88 (discussing the questionable
status of the six Justices' assertion in Guest).
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The Brzonkala court also stated that the VAWA was both
over- and underbroad.213 The court's assertion that the VAWA
is underinclusive is accurate because the Act does not provide
a cause of action for victims of non-gender-based crimes who
suffer from unequal state treatment. Congress's findings sup-
port the conclusion that state criminal justice systems are bi-
ased in enforcing laws protecting women from violent crimes
that are both gender and non-gender motivated.214 While the
court's observation is accurate, it does not render the Act un-
constitutional, because state or federal legislation need not cor-
rect all identifiable problems in one step.215 As the Supreme
Court has noted, legislatures may "take one step at a time, ad-
dressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most
acute to the legislative mind."216
The court's observation that the statute is overbroad is
also accurate because the Act provides a cause of action for
victims who do not suffer from state discrimination. This also
does not render the statute unconstitutional. Congress made
substantial findings justifying its decision not to require each
victim of gender-motivated violence to show that the state
treated him or her unfairly.217 Congress is entitled to signifi-
cant deference in its assessment of appropriate methods for
remedying equal protection violations218 and may implement
213. See supra notes 154-155 and accompanying text (explaining why the
Brzonkala court believed the VAWA was over- and underbroad).
214. See supra notes 101-106 and accompanying text (discussing Con-
gress's rationales for enacting the VAWA under its section 5 power). For in-
stance, inadequate state enforcement of rape laws is not dependent upon
whether the perpetrator harbored animus towards the victim's gender. Many
of Congress's findings support the conclusion that the criminal justice system
treats crimes against women differently, not just gender-based ones.
215. See, e.g., Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 294 U.S. 608,
610 (1935) (stating that state legislation need not "strike all evils at the same
time"); Roschen v. Ward, 279 U.S. 337, 339 (1929) (stating that "[a] statute is
not invalid under the Constitution because it might have gone farther than it
did").
216. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
217. As the United States noted in its brief supporting the VAWA,
"Congress found a systemic failure to provide equal protection and enacted a
systemic solution: a supplemental federal remedy to respond to the failings of
the state systems. The remedy crafted by Congress accords with the nature of
its findings." Brief for United States, supra note 203, at *15.
218. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (discussing the deference
given to Congress's choice of remedy for equal protection violations).
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overbroad prophylactic rules to address those violations. 19 The
VAWA's remedy is analogous to the one upheld in City of
Rome, which supported overbroad remedies when Congress
demonstrated the pervasive nature of state discrimination.220
Congress identified the pervasive nature of inadequate and bi-
ased enforcement of laws prohibiting gender-based crimes
throughout the country and determined that a civil rights rem-
edy for all victims, regardless of whether they could prove that
they actually suffered from state discrimination, provided the
best remedy to that problem. Congress's ability to impose over-
broad regulations to remedy equal protection violations and
the judicial deference given to Congress's choice of those
remedies support a conclusion that the VAWA's overbreadth
does not create a constitutional violation.
CONCLUSION
The VAWA's civil rights remedy provides a long overdue
recognition of victims' rights to be free from gender-motivated
violence. Numerous studies reveal the prevalence of gender-
motivated violence and expose the inadequate and discrimina-
tory response from state criminal justice systems. These studies
demonstrate that gender-based crimes are treated less seriously
and result in fewer prosecutions and convictions than similar
non-gender motivated violent crimes. Stereotypes about vic-
tims of gender-motivated violence and insensitive police, prose-
cutors, and judges make securing justice even more difficult.
The VAWA seeks to remedy these inequities by creating a pri-
vate civil cause of action for women to vindicate their interests
and deter potential criminals outside of the biased and dis-
criminatory state criminal justice systems.
In Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State University,
the court held that Congress did not have authority to enact
the VAWA under the Commerce Clause or section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. While the court reached the correct
conclusion regarding Congress's authority under the Com-
merce Clause, it failed to recognize that Congress possessed
authority to enact the VAWA under section 5. Future courts
219. See supra note 76 (noting Congress's ability to enact overbroad regu-
lations to remedy equal protection concerns).
220. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (noting that Rome did not
have discriminatory intent, but the Court upheld application of the overbroad
remedy nonetheless).
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should uphold the Act under section 5 because it provides an
appropriate remedy to a legitimate equal protection concern,
without violating other constitutional provisions. Upholding
the VAWA under section 5 allows courts to adhere to constitu-
tional limitations while vindicating important civil rights in
the absence of appropriate state remedies. Future courts
should therefore recognize Congress's ability to create private
causes of action under section 5 to respond to states' depriva-
tions of equal protection and uphold the VAWA.
